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WEST 7TMIINIA LAW QUABTEBLY
A MODERN SUBSTITUT, FOR BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS
By L. CARLIN*
P RIOR to the reign of Edward I,' a litigant in a common-law
action could have appellate relief in respect to judicial error
only as to matters appearing on the face of the record as an in-
trinsic part of those proceedings which had come to be recognized
as constituting the technical record of the case. 2 Consequently, in
order to have a proper understanding of the method and extent of
early appellate procedure and to appreciate fully the purpose and
function of subsequent remedial Statutes, it is necessary to know
something about the nature and scope of the common-law record.
First of all, it should be remembered that in early common-law
actions, out of which the record evolved, all the proceedings, from
the initial pleading up to the final judgment, were had ore tenus
in open court.3 In the very beginning, there was no record of the
proceedings at all, except in the memory of the trial judges. In-
deed, it was only reluctantly that a written record of the ease was
finally permitted to prevail over the memory of the justices.4 When
a written record finally came to be recognized, it was based on an
extended and connected minute of the oral proceedings, recorded
on a roll of parchment by a court officer who performed the duties,
*Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
11272-1307.
2Taliaferro v. Franklin, 1 Grat. 339 (Va. 1845) ; Dryden v. Swinburne, 20 W. Va.
89, 108 (1882); Roanoke Land and Improvement Co. v. Karn, 80 Va. 589, 592
(1885).
2ANDREWS' STEPHEN, PRINCIPLES Or PLEADING, 2 ed., 146-147. It is not certain
when oral pleadings as a general practice were abandoned, mid., 151. However.
it seems that written pleadings were not well established until the reign of Elizabeth
(1558,-1603). wILLYAm SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, "The Development of Written and
Oral Pleading," 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLo-AmERicAN LEGAL HISTORY, 633; 22 L.
QuAnT Pv. 360-382. Even after It became the practice to write out the pleadings
in the first instance, they were still transcribed to the record roll. ANDREWS'
STEPHENS, supra, 150-151.
'2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HIST. ENG. LAW, 2 ed., 669-670. The word "record"
is derived from a Norman-French word meaning primarily to remember. "Recorder
anciently signified to recite or testify on recollection, as occasion might require, what
had previously passed in court." In early Norman court proceedings, not only the
judges, but bystanders, could testify as to the record and were called recordeurs.
ANDREWS' STEPHEN, supra, Appendix, note 11. The earliest plea rolls date from the
year 1194. 1 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, supra, 169.
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devolving upon the clerk or prothonotary of the court in modem
procedure. In fact, this minute of the court officer, recording
from time to time in chronological order, and generally at numer-
ous sittings of the court, the appearance of the parties, the plead-
ings, continuances and other matters leading up to the issue, a
brief recital of the mode of trial, the result of the trial (in early
days the trial really followed the judgment), and the judgment
of the court, was the very record itself, and was known as the
record roll.5  The record, as evidenced by the record roll, was the
final and inexorable guide controlling the judgment and fixing the
rights of the parties. Being a verity, it could not be impeached.6
Consequently, for the very reason that it was the basis of authority,
its prima facie purport bounded the entire field of appellate in-
quiry. The trial court could speak only by its record, and the
voice of justice had no other medium for reaching the ear of
appellate relief.
It is easy enough to understand why an appellate court, on its
inquiry into matters of error, should be confined to some sort of
a record of the proceedings in the lower court. From the very
nature of appellate procedure on writs of error, nothing was, nor
is, done or tried de novo.7 The appellate court simply looks at
what has already been done and says "right," or "wrong," as the
case may be, sending the parties back for-further relief, if any
there be, to the trial court. The appellate court has no means
of knowing what has been done or what has not been done, unless
through the medium of something in the nature of a record, call it
what you will. But all these facts, necessarily conceded, do not
explain why the record itself, in the first instance, was not broader
in scope. Professor Minor, speaking of the modem record, says:
"The record proper, indeed, exhibits nothing but the formal
allegations or peadings on either side, the papers of which
profert is made, and oyer demanded, the issue, the impanelling
of the jury, or waiver of one, a demurrer to evidence, the
verdict, and the judgment. (Mandeville v. Perry, 6 Call, 83;
White v. Toncray, 9 Leigh, 351),-the mere lifeless skeleton,
as it were, of the cause. The occurrences in court during the
sAwDnws" ST' 33iENs, supra, 148-149.
61It was preserved as a perpetual, intrin8ic and exclusively admissible testimony
of all the judicial transactions which it comprised." Ibid., p. 149. The record is
no less a verity In modem times. Braden v. Reitzenberger, 18 W. Va. 286 (1881);
State v. Vest, 21 W. Va. 796 (1883).-
WFouse v. Vandervort, 30 W. Va. 327, 331-333, 4 S. E. 298 (1887).
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trial-all that impart life, animation, and interest to the pro-
ceedings-are unnoticed. No vestige remains of the examina-
tion of the witnesses, the instructions and opinions of the
court, or the behavior of the jury."8
A comparison will show that the scope of the modern record
differs little, if any, in extent from that of the ancient record.
In fact, by reason of statutes abolishing formal technical matters
of procedure, such as those relating to continuances, which for-
merly cluttered the record with endless prolixity, the variety-con-
tent of the record has gradually diminished rather than ex-
panded.10 In the perspective of modern procedure, it may be
rather difcult to understand why the trial incidents mentioned by
Professor Minor were not made a part of the record in the very
earliest of common-law trials. In fact, since the pleadings and all
matters constituting the record, as well as pure trial matters (to
the extent that there were any in court), were delivered orally in
open court in those days, there would seem to have been less reason
then for differentiating in theory between the two different classes
of proceedings than there is now when practically all pleadings
are presented in writing in the first instance, while trial matters
are oral unless reduced to writing for purposes of exception. In
other words, the analogy was closer then than it is now.
From the historical view-point, perhaps the most facile ex-
planation, and one which may be asserted and maintained with
little knowledge of the actual facts of early trial procedure, is that
of necessity. For example, the parchment rolls upon which the
records were entered were scarce and expensive, and in Jhe
absence of mechanical aids and the stenographic art, the mak.
ing of record entries was necessarily slow and laborious. That
84 MINOR, INSTITUTEs, 3 ed., 912. In Roanoke Land and Imp. Co. V. Karn, note
2. supra, the court says (p. 591): "The case must be heard and considered In this
court upon the errors apparent upon the face of the record. In White v. Toncray,
9 Leigh 347, 351, Judge Tucker says: 'The record is made up of the writ (for pur-
poses of amending by if necessary) ; the whole pleadings between the parties; papers
of which profert is made or oyer demanded, and such as have been specially sub-
mitted to the consideration of the court by a bill of exceptions, a demurrer to evi-
dence, or a special verdict, or are inseparably connected with some paper or evi-
dence so referred to. These, with the several proceedings at the rules, or in court,
until the rendition of the Judgment, constitute the record in common law suits, and
no others.' Mandeville v. Perry, 6 Call, 78, 93; cited and approved in White v.
Toncray, 9 Leigh 347, 351."
9A good example of a modern record will be found in 4 MINOR, INSTITUTES, 3 ed.,
1091 et seq. See PERRy, C. L. Pi-, Appendix, for interesting specimens of common.
law records of the reign of Charles II.2
°See citations In note 9.
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there was expediency, if not necessity, in requiring the record
rolls to be as brief as possible, cannot be denied; but what effect
such expediency or necessity might haive had iii eliminatiig trial
matters from the record is nothing more than conjecture, 6wing to
the fact that another excluding cause operating from the beginning
never gave necessity or expediency a chance to show their influence.
The early modes of trial, e. g., by ordeal; by battle, or even by
compurgation (wager of law), involved little or no procedure to
go into .the record. The process of the trial was not to discover a
fact or a state of facts which had already occurred and to apply
the finding to a determination of the issue, or to let the issue itself
terminate in such finding, as in the modern jury verdict. Rather,
the issue was decided upon the result or effect of causes set in
motion by the trial process, upon a fact in futuro with reference
to the issue and having no connection whatever with the pleadings.
The -ultimate fact of the trial was acted out, manufactured, not
estabiished. It had absolitely no logical connection with the
pleadings and the issue in the nature of cause or effect, nor was
it deducible from them. Its arbitrarily positive or negative result
with respect to the issue, by means of which it decided the issue
in a collateral way, was supposed to be controlled by divine and
inscrutable guidance, and of course the result could not be im-
peached. The divine process could not be observed, even if any
court had possessed the temerity to have questioned it. The record
was concerned only with the result of the trial, and only the result
finally, with the advent of trial by jury, went into the record.
Even trial by compurgation, although a formal step toward trial
witnesses as we know them, was nothing more than a solemn sanc-
tion. Instead of being a true process of inquiry, it was essentially
an evasion of trial."
nFor general references, see REEVES, HISToRY or ENGLISH LAW; 2 POLLOCK AND
KAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 598-674; HOLDSWORTH, "The Development of
Oral and Written Pleading," 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AmERICAN LEGAL HISTORY,
614-642; lloLDswoRrz, "'The Year Books," 22 L. QtYAnT. REv. 360-382; ANDREWS'
STEPHE.,, PLEADING, 2 ed., oh. 5; THAYER, PREYINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE,
eh. 1, "The Older Modes of Trial"; 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY, 367-402; 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, oh. 1, §8.
"Since the trial was a matter of form, and the Judgment was a determination
what form it should take. the judgment naturally came before the trial. It de-
termined not only what the trial should be, but how it should be conducted and
when. and what the consequence should be of this or that result.
"In these trials there are various conceptions: the notion of a magical test, like
the effect of the angel's spear upon Milton's toad-
'Him thus intent, Ithuriel with his spear
touched lightly ........ up he starts,
Discovered and surprised;'
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With the Norman Conquest, came the germ of the jury system, 2
at the same time with trial by battle. It was many years, how-
ever, before trial by jury was finally freed from the old Norman
idea of an inquisition. At first the jurors were selected with ref-
erence to their own peculiar knowledge, or their opportunity for
acquiring knowledge, of the facts to be tried. Their verdict was
based upon their immediate knowledge, reinforced with knowledge
acquired by non-judicial inquiry before the trial, rather than upon
the testimony of witnesses in court. The jury came already pre-
pared to render a verdict, having been informed beforehand of the
issue to be tried. There was no process of judicial inquiry leading
up to the verdict to form the basis of error.13 Practically, there
that of a call for the direct intervention of the divine justice (judiciam Doi, Gottesur-
theil); that of a convenient form or formula, sometimes having a real and close
relation to the probable truth of fact, and sometimes little or no relation to it,
like a child's rigmarole in a game-good, at all events, for reaching a practical re-
suit; that of regulating the natural resort of mankind to a fight; that of simply
abiding the appeal to chance. There was also, conspicuously and necessarily, the
appeal to human testimony, given under an oath, and, perhaps, under the responsi-
bility of fighting in support of it. But what we do not yet find, or find only In its
faint germs, is anything such as we know by the name of a trial; any determination
by a court which weighs this testimony or other evidence in the scale of reason, and
decides a litigated question as it is decided now. That thing, so obvious and so
necessary, as we are apt to think it, was only worked out after centuries." THATE16
PRELIx. TpEAT., 9-10; 2 SELECT ESSAYS, 369-370.
"I use the word 'trial', because it is the word in common use during recent
centuries. But as applied to the old law this word is an anachronism. The old
phrases were probatio, purgatio, defensio; seldom, if ever, in the earlier period,
triatio. In those days, people 'tried' their own issues; and even after the jury came,
e. g., in the early part of the thirteenth century, one is sometimes said to clear
himself (purgarc so) by a jury; just as a man used to be said in our colonies to
'clear himself' and 'acquit himself' by his own oath, as against some accusations and
testimony of an Indian." Ibid., 16, note 1; 2 SELECT ESSAYS, 375, note 2.
"The language of the law, even in Bracton's day, has no word equivalent to our
trial. We have not to speak of trial; we have to speak of proof." 2 POLLOCK AND
MArIxAND, supra, 2 ed., 598.
'-1 Ibid., 140 Ct seq.; ThisER, PP.ELIA. TREAT., 7; 2 SELECT ESSAYS, 367 et seq.
"'The commonplace idea that the early jurors were selected from the vicinage
solely in order to obtain men having original knowledge of the trial subject is
erroneous. They were supposed to supplement any original knowledge that they
might have by inquiry of the vicinage, the true function of the Norman. inquisitors,
and to come into court fully prepared for a decision of the issue. -2 POLLOcK AND
MAiTLt ND, supra, 2 ed., 622-28. "As to the manner in which the jurors came to
their verdict, we know that as a general rule they had ample notice of the question
which was to be addressed to them. At the least a fortnight had been given them
in which to 'certify themselves' of the facts. We know of no rule of law which
prevented them from listening during this interval to the tale of the litigants;
indeed it was their duty to discover the truth. Then, when the day of trial had
come, we take it that the parties to the cause had an opportunity of addressing the
jurors collectively." Ibid., 627-628. Also, see ANDREWS' STEPHEN, PLEADINo, 2 ed.,
261-262. Indeed, in those days, a witness who volunteered testimony was looked
upon as an intermeddler and was punished as such for maintenance. Witnesses re-
fused to testify except under t he compulsion and protection of chancery courts. It
5
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were no rules of evidence prior to the thirteenth century." There
being no rules of evidence, none could be violated. It was long
after the beginning of the thirteenth century before the jury trial,
depending chiefly upon witnesses and extrinsic testimony, ap-
proximated the modern procedure. 5 And it must not be forgotten
that during all this time the ancient modes of trial, by battle, by
ordeal and by compurgation," were competitors of the more mod-
em and rational method, inevitably coloring the procedure in its
development.1I
It follows from what has been said that the science of pleading
in its advanced stages of development is much older than the
was not until 1563 that a statute Was passed allowing process to compel the at-
tendance of trial witnesses, who made their full advent with the adoption of writ-
ten pleadings. HOLDSWoRTH, "The Development of Oral and Written Pleading," 2
SELECT ESSAYS, 629-636; THAYFE, PRELIm. TRFAT., 125-129.
""Up to the period of the 1200s, the history of the rules of evidence, in the
modern sense, Is like the chapter upon ophidians In Erin; for there were none.
Under the primitive practices of trial by ordeal, by battle, and by compurgation, the
proof is accompanied by a judicium dei, and there is no room for our modern notion
of persuasion of the tribunal by the credibility of the witnesses; for the tribunal
merely verified the observance of the due formalities, and did not conceive of these
as directly addressed to their own reasoning powers." 1 Wio OR, Ev., §8, (1).
'-'Ibid., §8, (1)-(3).
2GBy a decree of the fourth Lateran Council at Rome, 1215, churchmen were for-
bidden to assist in trial by ordeal. 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, 2 ed., 599. "That
this was recognized and accepted in about three years (1218-19) by the English
crown is shown by the well-known writs of Henry III. to the judges, dealing with
the puzzling question of what to do for a mode of trial, cum prohibitum sit per
Ecclesiam Romanam Jtdicium ignis et aquae." THAYER, PRELIM. TREAT., 37; 2
SELECT ESSAYS, 394-395. Henry's predicament is a plain comment on the pre-
valence of the older modes of trial at that time. Trial by ordeal had been the
poor man's trial, particularly the Saxon's. Trial by battle came with the Normans,
and was fostered by the nobility. Abandonment of the ordeal gave a great impetus
to the development of jury trial, which offered the poor man an admirable substitute
for the older method. The other primitive modes of trial lived longer. "At last
came the famous appeal of murder in 1819' [Ashford v. Thornton, 1 B. & AId. 405]
in which the learning of the subject was fully discussed by the King's Bench, and
battle was adjudged to be still 'the constitutional mode of trial' in this sort of case.
As in an Irish case in 1815, so here, to the amazement of mankind, the defendant
escaped by means of this rusty weapon. And now, at last, in June, 1819, came the
abolition of a long-lived relic of barbarism, which had survived In England when
all the rest of Christendom had abandoned it." THAYER, 45; 2 SELECT ESSAYS, 401.
It is no less remarkable that trial by compurgation was not abolished until 1833.
THAYEn, 34; 2 SELECT ESSAYS, 391.
27"The jury became almost the only mode of proof at a time when these old ideas
of a trial were still prevalent; and consequently the jury was regarded as settling
the matter in the same final and inscrutable manner as compurgation, battle, or
ordeal. Therefore Just as in the older law all the legal interest in the case turned
upon what we should now regard as preliminary matters, such as the rules of pro-
cess for getting the parties before the court, and the rules which defined the modes
in which they should state their case when they were before the court." HOLDSWORTH,
"The Development of Written and Oral Pleading," 2 SELECT ESSAYS, 621; "The Year
Books" II, 22 L. QU!ART. RrV. 360-382. See 1 WIGOOR, EVnTENCE, §8, (2) ; THAYER,
PaELIM. ThEAT., ch. 1; 2 SELECT ESSAYS, 367-402.
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science of evidence and trial procedure. The former had become
firmly fixed on a more or less rational basis at a time when the
latter were still enveloped in the mist of formalism and supersti-
tion. The science of pleading had already, by years of precedent,
definitely defined and. limited the scope of the record before trial
procedure had produced anything really worthy of going into the
record. In the early days, what little significance a common-law
action had as a means of dealing out justice depended more upon
the course and result of the pleadings than upon the trial of the
issue.18 The record served the purpose, at the least, of res ad-
judicata, and thus prevented the recurrence of a farce; while the
trial itself was frequently a farce pure and simple.
By the end of the twelfth century, the jury had become firmly
established as an institution in trial procedure. 19  Even during
the period while the jurors were yet ex officio the witnesses (or more
properly, inquisitors) in the case, such a method was vastly su-
perior to the older methods of trial. In fact, such a method
amounted to a trial (although one in which the evidence rushed
headlong at the pleadings, instead of being guided by them) ; while
the older methods, excluding any psychological influence that a con-
sciousness of being upon the right side may have had upon an
issue entirely dissociated from the issue in the pleadings, amounted
to nothing more than the tossing of a coin. Naturally, in the
course of the next three centuries?' during which trial by jury,
'
5
"So far are we from the rule of later law that evidence must not be pleaded, that
we might almost say that oral evidence was generally brought to the notice of the
court by pleading it." HOLDSWORTH, supra, 2 SELECT ESSAYS, 627. "All the
legal interest of the case was centered in the questions which led up to the award
of proof." Ibid., 620-21. "The evidence, which in modern times is given by such
witnesses, was at this period supplied partly by the jury, which the law was uareful
to draW from the neighborhood of the occurrence, partly by the custom of pleading
such evidence. For this reason questions turning upon the 'venue' of the jury are
of much importance in the Year Books; and for the same reason counsel deem
themselves to be in a manner responsible for the statements which they make to
the Court. They examine their clients before they put forward a plea. They even
decline to plead a fact as to the truth of which they have doubts. Sometimes, In-
deed, we see a distinction taken between the plea and the evidence for the plea when
it is convenient to 'say that a statement Is only evidence and not really a plea. But,
as a general rule, it would be true to say that such distinct things as the pleadings,
the statements of counsel, and the evidence for those statements are hardly ds-
tingulsbed in the year books." Ibid., 629-630. In many instances, cases were de-
cided wholly by examination of the sccta, by profert and oyer of documents, and by
other preliminary matters, which, while pure pleading adjuncts, were nevertheless
essentially evidential in character-were evidence at the front rather than at the
end of the issue. THAvEn, PRELrI. TaEAT., 10-16; 2 SELECT EssAys. 370-375.
191 WIGMOE, By., §8; THAYEE, PaELIM. TREAT., ch. 2; 2 PoLTxocz AND MAITLAND,
2 ed., 641.
2Ciro. 1200-1500. 1 WIGMOrE, Bv., §8.
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aided by rational and definite rules of evidence; was slowly emerg-
ing out of the old Norman institution of inquest and unfolding-
into its modern state of efficiency, the trial procedure in an action
at law gradually became relatively more important in its judicial
phases. And although, in accordance with the ancient idea of the
functions of a trial, only the ultimate result, or culmination, of
-the trial, the verdict of the jury, was important to start with,
people were bound to realize that trial proceedings leading up to
and controlling the verdict were just as important as the pleadings
and other parts of the record itself. A demand, was sure to come
for relief on writ of error against erroneous rulings of the court
in the progress of the trial. If such a demand had come in the
beginning of common-law procedure, trial matters, or -some of
them, might possibly have entered into the minutes- of the record
roll as an intrinsic part of the record; but when the demand came,
-the scope of the record had been definitely limited for so long a
time it could not permit the intrusion of such exotic company. To
'have done so would have done violence to legal precedent, even if
there had been no other obstacle in the way.2'
Legislative action was the only resource, and necessarily any
remedial statute must have been based on one of two opposite
theories. Either the scope of the record proper had to be extended
so as to include trial error, or some means had to be devised of
directing appellate inquiry outside of the record. Whatever meth-
od might have been pursued, it was indispensable, at the least,
to reduce the subject-matter of the exception to writing and pro-
perly authenticate it. Preservation of the precise facts as well as
placing them before the appellate tribunal demanded this much.
We could not expect to find such a statute making provision for
authentication of any trial matters already reduced to writing
in laec verba, because at that time there were no such matters.
Written instructions, stenographic notes, and sworn court report-
ers deft in the stenographic art are all products of a later age.
Up to this point, it may be assumed that the framers of the
statute advanced without hesitation. But here, we may imagine
them as having paused and considered whether the authenticated
-exceptions should be made a part of the technical record, or
-whether the appellate tribunal should be required to consider them
mOwing to the paucity and cost of materials, the laboriousness and delay in mak-
ing record entries, and the conditional importance of exceptions, necessity or ex-
Pediency would likely have bad much weight in deciding the matter.
8
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as a mere adjunct or supplement to the record. Practically., sinee
authentication would seem to have been the prime essential and
the authenticated exceptions, as such, could have been preserved
just as carefully as the record roll, it would seem to have made
little difference which method had prevailed. But the stage of pro-
cedure, in its historical perspective, was set for the former alter-
native. It was easier, less startling, to reconcile judicial prece-
dent to an expansion of the record than it was to bend the line of
appellate vision. As a result, we have the statute of Westminster
11, 13 Edw. I., e. 31 (1285), creating bills of exceptions, and, for
the first time in the history of the common law, granting appel-
late relief for judicial error committed in the course of a trial22
To this day, in most common-law jurisdictions, the bill of excep-
tions is an essential intermediary between trial error and appellate
review.2 1
It is assumed that the statute contemplated making bills of ex-
ceptions technically parts of the record, and such was the judicial
construction placed upon it ;24 but such a construction is far from.
being based upon the explicit language of the statute. The pre-
scribed formality whereby the trial justice was required to appear
before the appellate tribunal and confess or deny his seal may
have been intended merely as an additional means of authentica-
tion, and not as any quasi-nuptial ceremony whereby the bill of
exceptions was united with the record 5 Or, even if the Statute
="When one impleaded before any of the justices alleges an exception, praying
that they will allow it, and if they will not, and he, that alleges the exception.
writes the same, and requires the justices will put to their seals, the justices shall
do so; and if one will not, another shall; and if upon complaint made of the Justicex
the king cause the record to come before him, and the exception be not found in the,
roll, and the plaintiff show the written exception with the seal of the justices thereto
put, the justice shall be commanded to appear at a certain day, either to confess or-
deny his seal, and if he cannot deny his seal, they shall proceed to judgment ac-
cording to the exception, as It ought to be allowed or disallowed." Dryden V_
Swinburne, 20 W. Va. 89, 108 (1882).
=Bashar v. Railway Co., 73 W. Va. 39, 79 S. E. 1009 (1913).
2 Taliaferro v. Franklin, and Dryden v. Swinburne, supra, note 2.
25"Under this statute the practice was, upon the return of the writ of error the-
judge was summoned by a writ to appear personally and to confess or deny his seal
If he confessed it, the proper entry was made, and it became then a part of the
record. In Money, Watson & Blackmore v. Dryden Leach, 3 Burrows 1692, 1693
a minute account is given of the manner, in which this statute was carried out;
and as it is a rather amusing exhibition of the formalities of that day, I give an ex-
tract from the report. After setting forth this writ at: length the report proceeds
'The Lord Chief Justice Pratt having now come into the court, pursuant to the.
command contained in said writ, delivered it to the Lord Chief Justice of this court.
Mr. Owen at the same time delivering the original bill of exceptions into Lord.
Mansfield's hands. Whereupcn Lord Mansfield, showing to the Lord Chief Justice,
9
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of Westminster II contemplated that bills of exceptions should be
part of the record proper, it may have been intended that they
should become such per se through the process of authentication.0
These questions, like many other legal questions discussed in iso-
lation, may seem purely academic; but the fact that bills of excep-
tions have been identified with the record undoubtedly has had two
important practical effects upon the course of modern procedure.
First, bills of exceptions have partaken of the sanctity of the
record and, being a verity, cannot be impeached;27 and second,
much technicality has attended the application of modern statutes
requiring bills of exceptions to be identified in court orders making
them a part of the record.28
The Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. I., c. 31, with some few
changes in substance and phraseology, was incorporated into the
Virginia Code.29  The West Virginia statute is based upon the
Virginia Code, and hence is a lineal descendant of the ancient Sta-
tute of Westminster II.1 s In addition to the fact that the formality
of sealing the bill of exceptions is not required under the West Vir-
ginia statute,"' the chief distinction between the two statutes is
in the method of making the bill a part of the record. Under the
ancient statute, as has been observed, this formality was accom-
plished by the trial justice's confessing his seal before the'su-
perior tribunal, and hence the bill did not become a part of the
record until the hearing in the court of review. 2 Under the West
Pratt the seal thereunto affixed asked him, whether that was his lordship's seal or
not, to which question his lordship answering in the affirmative, Lord Mansfield
redelivered the bill of exceptions to Mr. Owen, at the "same time delivering the
above mentioned writ with orders, that it should be filed. The Lord Chief Justice
of the Common Pleas immediately retired without sitting down and the Lord Chief
Justice of this court 'attended him, till he was got past the puisne judge but not quite
to the door of the court ' " GitEEN, J., in Dryden v. Swinburne, supra.
.Such has been the rule in Virginia, by virtue of statute. VA. CODE, 1904,
§3385; BuneS, PL. and Pn., 523-524.
2Cummings -v. Armstrong, 34 W. Va. 1, 11 S. E. 742 (1890) ; State v. Vest, 21
W. Va. 796. Perhaps this is the only consistent rule, although without doubt
contributing to the particular precision required in authenticating bills of excep-
tion and making them a part of the record. If the thing is to be immutable, all the
more reason there is that it should be fashioned truly. Impeachment of the truth
of a bill, however, would lead to a trial within a trial, contrary to the economy of
the law, and might demand an anomalous inquiry in the appellate court outside of
the record, amounting to a trial de novo.
28Observe numerous illustrative cases in succeeding foot-notes.
"Taliaferro v. Franklin, 1 Grat. 339 (Va. 1845).
sW. VA. CODE, c. 131, § 9. Note that our statute specifically requires the bill
of exceptions expressly to be made a part of the record after authentication. Dryden
v. Swinburue, 20 W. Va. 89, 109 (1882).
51Carr v. Coal Co., 64 W. Va. 448, 63 S. E. 334 (1908).
"sDryden v. Swinbure, supra.
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Virginia statute, the bill is made a part of the record in the trial
court by a court order there entered of record. 3
The Statute of Westminster II and its progeny are highly reme-
dial in purpose and character. Nevertheless, in application they
have been productive of no little technicality. In too many of our
extant decisions, honest attempts -to comply -with the statute have
resulted in obliteration rather than authentication.
A brief comparison will show that, in very many respects, a mo-
dern action at law is the direct antithesis of an action contempor-
aneous with the Statute of Westminster II. Our nearest approach
to the record roll is a miscellaneous order. book. The pleadings,
now reduced to writing in the first instance, although they still
constitute the gist of the technical record, are not copied into the
order book at all, and exist solely in the files.34 Ordinarily, they
have no business in court until an issue for the court or jury to try
has been made up in the clerk's office. Formerly, as has been ob-
served, court sessions were taken up almost exclusively with hear-
ing and regulating the pleadings, while the parties were left to try
the issue themselves as an aftermath to the judicial part of the
proceeding. Now, just the opposite is true. Parties are required
to plead and arrive at an issue before they come into court, while
the court's time is given almost exclusively to regulating the trial
of the issue.3 5 The great bulk of the record proper is made up
outside of court. A sworn court officer,36 as of old, records minutes
of the proceedings in court; but now the evidence in the case (trial
proceedings), and not the "mere lifeless skeleton" of which Pro-
fessor Minor speaks, forms the substance of his notes. Instruc-
tions are now written out and authenticated by the signature of
the judge in the form of his initials, instead of being delivered as
a more or less extemporaneous oral charge by the court.3 7 In fact,
prior to the Statute of Westminster II, in that time when the rec-
ord was being clothed with all its sanctity, the components of a
modern law action would have been classified with a rather start-
ling result. In accord with the then existing criterion, the evi-
83Dryden v. Swinburne, supra; Duckworth v. Stalnaker, 68 W. Va. 197, 201, 69
S. E. 850 (1909).
3Except, of course, formal pleadings, such as the general issue, 8imiliter, eto.,
which may be pleaded orally and evidenced only by a court order.
'5Rule days were designed to this end. McDermitt v. Newman, 64 W. Va. 195,
199, 61 S. E. 300 (1908).
3 5The stenographer, or short-hand reporter. W. VA. CODE, a. 114B; Cummings V.
Armstrong, 31 W. Va. 1, 11 S. H. 742 (1890).
3TW. VA. Cons, c. 131. § 22.
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dence would have been considered per se a part of the record,
because recorded during the course of the proceeding by an officer
of the court; but the pleadings would have constituted no part of
the record, because not copied into the order book, the modern
record roll!
The truth is that the Statute of Westminster II and its off-
spring have become hopelessly antiquated. And, although it can-
not be denied that many of our decisions applying the statute turn
on rather technical considerations, the basic fault does not lie with
the courts. The anachronism is statutory, not judicial. Our
statute, construed with the maximum of liberality, is but a clumsy
expedient to overcome difficulties which do not exist."' The work-
ing of the statute has always been attended with too much compli-
cation. It is a machine with an overplus of levers. Identification
and incorporation must follow upon identification and incorpora-
tion, from paper to paper,3 9 from paper to bill 4 0 and from bill to
court order.4 1 Much of this was useless to start with and more of
it has become obsolete. So much of it has degenerated into mere
formality that the real function of the statute has been lost in
hopeless confusion.
Many are the instances wherein identification in the bill of ex-
traneous writings or documents by reference has failed.42  But the
exceptor must go further. It has been said that not only must he
identify the subject-matter of his exception by reference, but he
must also purport to incorporate it by reference.4" Use of the
'
8BAnoN BOWEN, -Progress in the Administration of Justice During the Victorian
Period," 1 SELrc ESSAYS, 516, 522, speaks of "the difficult formalities of the rule
as to bills of exceptions-an old-fashioned and often impracticable method of chal-
lenging the direction of a judge."
Formalism had its use in early days. Transactions were not then evidenced by
writings. Overt acts, observed by witnesses, were a general means of preserving
the status of legal rights. Formality connected with the transaction made a vivid
impression upon the memory of witnesses. Dramatics made a substitute, though
a poor one, for records. The best example, perhaps, is the ceremony of livery of
"seisln. The ancient requirement that sales of personalty be conducted in the pres-
ence of witnesses is another instance. But when the necessity for such a formality
ceases, there is nothing left to guide the process. There must be unreasoning sub-
mission to the letter of the formal requirement or nothing at all. The formality
becomes a functionless survival in the legal organism, clogging and breaking down
the normal vital processes of justice.
39McKendree v. Shelton, 51 W. Va. 516, 41 S. E. 909 (1902).
"Woods v. King, 59 W. Va. 418, 53 S. E. 605 (1905).
a*Winters v. Null, 31 W. Va. 450, 7 S. E. 443 (1888).
'
2
rhe numerous cases will be found under the title "Bills of Exception," ENCyC.
DIG. VA. & W'. VA. REP.
"
5Tracy's Adm'x v. Carver Coal Co., 57 W. Va. 597, 50 S. E. 825 (1905). This
case seems rather technical. It would seem that express reference ought to mean
12
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"skeleton" bill of exceptions, although making this dangerous
method of extraneous reference necessary, has been commended by
the courts as a labor-saving device." It happens to be a labor-
saving expedient because many matters of exception in modern
trial procedure, in fact the great bulk of them in the form of in-
structions and evidence, are reduced to writing independently of
the bill of exceptions. Incorporation by reference saves the task
of copying into the bill something which is already reduced to
writing. At the time when the "skeleton" bill _of exceptions is
certified, the writing incorporated by reference must have been in
existence and is supposed to have been inspected and approved be-
fore the bill is signed by the judge.4 5 The formality attendant
upon such a proceeding is an open invitation to error. Practically,
the judge knows that the stenographer's notes are the best evi-
dence of the testimony,48 the very means by which he removes any
doubts from his mind, and there is a temptation to sign the bill in
advance of transcription of the evidence.4 7  The psychology of the
tendency is plain and illustrates well the general attitude assumed
in respect to other requirements. Unconsciously the signing of a
"skeleton" bill of exceptions is looked upon as an empty formal-
ity. In certifying the evidence by way of anticipation, the judge
feels that it is already, or will be, sufficiently authenticated, and
that he is signing the bill as a mere formality in order to bring it
into the record. The same observation is true as to instructions,
which must already have been authenticated by the judge's ab-
breviated signature. Search the field of error where you will, and
you will always find formality going hand in hand with error. The
remedy here, however, is simple; in fact, is so obvious that there
is, as in the ease above, an irresistible temptation to follow it, even
in the face of the law. In any instance where there is a writing
m Ued incorporation, where the reference could have been intended for no other pur-
pose. Here, the clerk had appended the evidence to the skeleton bill of exceptions,
Instead of inserting it in the bill in the spaces indicated for insertion. It is believed
that nowhere else than in a court proceeding would anybody have doubted that the
evidence appended was the evidence referred to in the court order.
" bid. The Inconsistency of finding it necessarily to commend an expedient so
dangerous argues something wrong with our procedure.
"Dbid. at 594.
"In fact, they are made so by statute. W. VA. CoDE, c. 114B, § 3. See Cum-
mings v. Armstrong, 34 W. Va. 1, 11 S. E. 742 (1890), to the effect that the
stenographer's notes were made official and the best evidence in order to relieve the
judge from attention to details of evidence, and in order to supply a substitute for
his memory.
47Cummings v. Armstrong, supra; Wells v. Smith, 49 W. Va. 78, 38 S. E. 547
(1901).
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which might be incorporated into a* bill of exceptions by reference,
let the judge certify the writing itself, merely noting thereon the
fact of the exception, and let the formal bill of exceptions be cast
aside.
However many the evils to be charged against the archaic statute,
-there is at least one instance wherein the courts, in pursuit of the
lull doctrine of "express incorporation by reference," seem to
'have gone to an extreme of technicality not warranted by the
statute itself. Professor Minor refers to this instance as
"The extraordinary, and, as it would seem, anomalous, rule
which prevails in our courts, forbidding, in general, reference
from one bill of exceptions to another, unless such reference be
specially made in the later bill, notwithstanding all the bills
are parts of one record; although it is permitted to refer to
a bill purporting to contain all the facts in the case, in con-
nection with other bills filed in the same cause."
4 8
The remedy in the latter instance is plain. Let the court look upon
the record as a whole, and not as a collection of dissociated parts.
Any one part of the record should be able to aid any other part,
'without the necessity of any express reference. This does not mean
that the appellate court should be compelled to grope for error.
There are several other expedients for pointing out error.49 Our
decisions amply prove that the bill of exceptions has plenty to do
in the task of dragging unwilling elements into the record, without
exhausting its vitality in assignments of error. Incidentally, it
has in most instances in the past performed the double task, but
there is no reason why it is bound to do so.
Another requirement, that of expressly making the bill of ex-
ceptions, after authentication, a part of the record by an order
of court, would seem to be based upon absolutely no reason.
Granting.that it is necessary for the bill to become actually a part
.of the record, there could be no better practical means of making
it such than to require it to be properly authenticated 0 If it has
not been sufficiently authenticated, it would be illogical to make
w4 MINoR, INST., 3 ed., 916, 1088.
4By specific assignments of error (1) on the motion for a new trial, (2) in the
Petition for a writ of error, or (3) in the brief of counsel. Kay v. Glade Creek
& R. R. Co., 47 W. Va. 467, 35 S. E. 973 (1900) ; Hinton Milling Co. v. New River
Milling Co., 7s W. Va. 314, 88 S. E. 1079 (1916).
=It has already been observed that such is sufficient In Va. Note 26, supra.
Such is the rule In Cal., Ga. Kan., Miss., Mo., Nev., and Ohio. See 4 STAND.
PFoC. 371, notes 63, 64.
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it a part of the record by any means whatsoever; but if it has-been
sufficiently authenticated, the entry of the formal order required
by the statute is nothing less than the quintessence of superfluity.
The statute should, and it is believed does, provide a sufficient
mode of authentication. In addition, it should expressly provide
that substantial compliance with such mode of authentication shaul
per se make the matter so authenticated a part of the record. If
inadvertent failure to comply with the statute were the only risk
involved, such risk alone would be sufficient condemnation of a
useless formality; but when our decisions show how difficult it has
been for counsel adequately to comply with the requirements of
the statute in this respect, even with all their conscious and skilled
effort, the situation would seem to be intolerable. The court order
serves absolutely no purpose of authentication. If the bill of ex-
ceptions were signed by some other functionary of the court, then
the court order might serve the useful purpose of showing the
judge's approval; but since the judge himself is required to sign
all bills of exceptions, the court order, for any purposes of authen-
tication, is a mere reiteration of what the court already has done.
And, since the bill of exceptions is not copied into the order book
as a part of the order,"' entry of the order adds no safeguard
whatsoever to its preservation. The tenuous line of reference be-
tween the order and the bill is meaningless in the absence of the
bill; in fact, too often it has been found meaningless in the pres-
ence of the bill.52
It is believed that all members of the profession will concur in
the advisability of a change in our procedure. The usual arga-
ment urged against change of long-established legal principles, the
admonition against doing violence to legal precedent, can have no
force in the present instance. This is a matter of procedure, not
of the substantive law, and cannot interfere in the slightest degree
with vested rights. It cannot be perceived that a change would
even in any way react upon or disturb the equilibrium of decisions
in associated phases of procedure. When the change is undertaken,
it is believed that it should be approached with a determination
to do away ivith all formality and to retain only essentials reduced
to terms of their greatest simplicity. The watchword should be
authentication, and authentication alone should bring the exception
"Bank v. Wetzel, 58 W. Va. 1, 50 S. E. 886 (1905).
=For allusion to additional features of the procedure under the W. Va. statute, see
notes 61 ct seq. on the Virginia statute.
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and its subject-matter into the record. Where the subject-matter
of any exception is already reduced to writing, the uncertainties of
reference should be eliminated by permitting the writing itself to
be certified, with an informal notation of the exception.5" Where
the matter or thing excepted to is not in writing at the time of the
exception and is not later reduced to writing for some other pur-
pose, let the facts, words or circumstances be reduced to writing
and certified informally, with a notation of the exception.1 As to
what should be sufficient authentication, certainly certification over
the signature of the presiding judge ought to be sufficient in any
instance. The West Virginia statute already requires the ruling
of the court to be noted on the instructions over the judge's ab-
breviated signature. All that remains to be done is to require him
to sign his full name under a notation of the exception. As to
the evidence, although there can be no great complication or hard-
ship in requiring it to be certified over the judge's signature, it is
believed that certification by the stenographer and the clerk (or
even by the stenographer alone, where the original papers are sent
up) should be sufficient., 5 Any paper, whatever its nature, per-
3'This observation has particular application to evidence and instructions. And
there is no reason why the statute, W. VA. COon, c. 114B, should not be amehded
so as to make the reporter's notes official and the best evidence, not only as to the
evidence, but as to all trial utterances, e. g., rulings of the court, remarks of the
court, jury or counsel, motions, arguments of counsel before the jury, or any re-
marks pertinent to the case and capable of being literally reported. In Mankin v.
Jones, 63 W. Va. 373, 380, 60 S. E. 248 (1907), BRANNON, J., says: "The report
contains remarks of court, remarks of counsel, interlocution between court and at-
torneys, and pages of argument of law questions before the court. Why should they
go into the stenographer's report?" The answer is that it may be expedient to have
some of them go in for the same reason that the evidence goes in; because they
may be the subject of a bill of exceptions. Of course, all the matters in exteto
mentioned by Judge BRANNON should not go into the official report. A motion ad-
dressed to the court might be very pertinent, while argument addressed to the court
out of the presence of the jury w.uld seem never to be pertinent. The statute should
be framed so as to leave some discretion to the reporter, with the provision that he
should report any matter requested by the court or counsel. Apportioning the costs
would be a means of keeping out totally irrelevant matter. Furthermore, it is
perfectly feasible to make the stenographer's report official and the best evidence
as to all trial proceedings, without undertaking to define the limit of the report
The Pennsylvania statute requires the reporter "to take down as part of his report
of the Judge's charge, every ruling, order, and remark of the judge relating to the
case upon trial, made in the presence of the jury, in any state of the proceeding."
Cummings v. Armstrong, 34 W. Va. 1, 11, 11 S. E. 742 (1890).
"Practically the old bill of exceptions, shorn of its formality; but seemingly the
simplest expedient available.
5Such has been held sufficient in Pennsylvania under a statute similar to the
W. Va. statute; and such, seemingly, has been held in W. Va. Cummings V. Arm-
strong, supra; Kay v. Glade Creek & R. R. Co., 47 W. Va. 467, 470-471, 35 S. E
970 (1900). The rule in W. Va. is very clearly otherwise now. Tracy's Adm'x '.
Carver Coal Co., 57 W. Va. 587, 50 S. E. 825 (1905). There might be a statutory
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taining to the ease and filed, either at rules or in court, by the
regular method for filing papers in a cause, should without any-
thing more be considered a part of the record.5 6 Where any mat-
ter of exception is already sufficiently shown in a court order so
as to enable the appellate court to determine from the order itself
or from any other part of the record in connection with the order
the propriety or impropriety of the trial court's ruling, nothing
more should be required.5 7  All the various elements of the record
should be read together as a whole, on the full principle of im-
plied reference. Mere pointing out of error, as a conscious end to
be sought, should be left to the petition of the plaintiff in error or
to the brief of counsel.
It is believed that practically all the features of reform sug-
middle ground. The judge's signature might be required only if demanded by either
party. This, however, might complicate the procedure too greatly, where the effort
should be to simplify as much as possible. In some states, statutes provide that a
bill of exceptions may be settled by bystanders where the trial judge refuses or
neglects to settle it. See citations to statutes and decisions in 4 STAND. PRoc. 348-
349, note 82. In one case, McDonald v. Faulkner, 2 Ark 472, bystanders actually
certified the bill. It is interesting to note the analogy between this procedure and
the ancient Norman custom of "making the record" from memory by bystanders,
,cecrden, .. See cote 4, supra. In fact, the two things are identical. And may It
not be argued that, just as the written record supplanted the recordcurs, so the re-
porter's notes should decide the truth of the evidence, rather than the judge, who
is only a degree more than a r'cordeucr?
3It is believed that such is already the law. Cummings v. Armstrong, supra;
State v. Vest, 21 W. Va. 796 (1883). Judge BunKs says: "Of course, no bill of
exceptions is necessary to introduce a matter already a part of the record. If the
record sufficiently shows a fact, for instance, that a motion was made to require a
bill of particulars, either of the plaintiff's claim or the defendant's grounds of de-
fence, and was overruled, no bill of exception is necessary, as the order showing tha
ruling of the court is In the nature of a judgment, and is per 8e a part of the record."
BUnKS, PL. AND Pa. 514, citing Driver -v. So. R. Co., 103 Va. 650, 49 S. E. 1000
(1905) ; Blue Ridge L. & P. Co. v. Tutwiler, 106 Va. 54, 55 S. E. 539 (1906). In
the above instance, the pleadings, which are already a part of the record, would
measure the propriety of the court's ruling. Would the rule hold good in all in-
stances where the subject-matter of the motion does not appear of record, or where
it is brought into the record by a bill of exceptions not connected by reference with
the order? If there is any doubt, it should be removed by statute. The borderland
between such matters already a part of the record by court order and matters need-
ing the mediation of a bill of exceptions has been dim. Particularly, is this true in
regard to rejected pleas, as .the following series of decisions will show: Perry V.
Horn, 22 W. Va 381 (1883) ; Spence v. Robinson, 35 W. Va. 313, 13 S. E. 1004
(1891) ; Quesenberry v,. People's Ass'n. 44 W. Va. 512. 30 S. R. 73 (1898) ; Bank v.
Houston, 66 W. Va. 337, 66 S. E. 465 (1909). It is pertinent to note here that
our law still requires the foolish formality of craving oyer In order to make procebs
a part of the record, except in cases of default judgments, and here no defendant has
appeared to act out the formality. Netter-Oppenheimer Co. V. Elfant, 63 W. Va.
99, 102, 59 S. E. 892 (1907).
UIt is believed that such is already the law, as judicially determined; but if there
is any doubt in any instance, it should be removed by statute. See authorities in
note 56, ,upra. Also, WV. VA. CODu c. 131, § 9; Congrove v. Burdette, 28 V. Va. 220
(1886) ; Shank v. Ravenswood. 43 W. Va. 242, 27 S. E. 223 (1897).
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gested above have been embodied in a recent act of the Virginia
Apsembly abolishing bills of exceptions. 8 It is furthermore be-
lieved that this statute could be adopted in West Virginia, with
very slight changes. However this may be, the statute contains
3w many admirable features that it is considered worth while to
publish it in extenso, for the benefit of those who are interested in
legal reform. (See Appendix). Even among those who may not
agree with the views of the writer or with the spirit of the Vir-
ginia statute, it will serve as a basis of discussion and add some
element by way of suggestion. As a fitting preface to the statute,
it will be interesting to know, in the words of the author of the
statute, the motives which prompted him in framing its provisions.
"The object of the bill as prepared by me, which after slight
amendment of its seventh section, was duly adopted, is ap-
parent to every practitioner who, like the writer, has, no doubt,
often wondered that the artificial form of the common law bill
of exceptions should have been so long suffered to endure to
vex the busy lawyer and to encumber the record with its
solemn and prolix phraseology. How finical the courts have
been with respect to the statutory punctilios respecting the
scope and authentication of these episodic features of a cause,
and how often a meritorious cause may have been lost on ap-
peal by a technical 'fluke,' due to misprison or inadvertence
of court or counsel in the completion of the record by the
necessary bill, is abundantly established in the Virginia re-
ports.
"To save time, to enlarge the powers of courts of review,
to eliminate as much of the rubbish of formula as possible,
consistently With clearness, and to mitigate costs of appeal,
constituted the object which the draftsman had in view."0
APPENDIX-8
An Act to abolish the bill of exception and to prescribe the
means whereby in the trial court the record of the cause in any
judicial proceeding at common law, or in any kindred pro-
ceeding in a suit in chancery, shall be ascertained and authen-
ticated; to prescribe certain duties of the trial judge and of
the clerk of the trial court, in respect to such record; and to
prescribe in certain respects how such record shall be certified
1 8VA. CODE, SUPPL. 1916, pp. 1194-1197, AcTs Or VA., 1916, C. 406.
"9The Statute of Westminster II is so ancient as to be looked upon as common law.
O*Excerpt from a letter written by Mr. Marshall R. Peterson, author of the
statute, published In 2 VA. LAW REG. (N. S.) 292.
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upon a writ of error, or supersedeas, to a final judgment, or
upon an appeal from a final decree, in the cause and to make
the provisions of this act apply to all cases now pending in
any court of this State and to any case in which bill of excep-
tion has been filed within the time required by law with the
trial judge, but not signed by him for any cause, and extend-
ing the time within which said bill of exception or certificate
may be signed.
Approved March 21, 1916. In effect June 17, 1916.
EXCEPTIONS IN TRIALS AT LAW.
1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of Virginia, That in
the trial of any cause at common law, or in any part, or at any stage
of any judicial proceeding in which the procedureP1 is that which
obtains at common law, any party may except to any action, ruling,
order or judgment of the court.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS ABOLISHED; How EXCEPTIONS SAVED.
2. That the bill of exception as heretofore employed in any
judicial proceeding as means of preserving an exception to any
action, ruling, order or judgment of any trial court by any party
be, and the same is hereby abolished, and that in lieu of such bill
of exception it shall be sufficient that, by a note thereto appended
or thereon endorsed, in case of the denial by the trial court of any
instruction to the jury, the trial judge shall certify that such
instruction was requested by any party and denied by the court,
and that the party requesting the same excepted; in case of any
instruction granted by the court, that any party excepted thereto-,
in case of any question propounded to a witness, that said question
was allowed or disallowed, according to the fact, and that any party
excepted; and shall further certify briefly, where such question is
disallowed, the answer which such question would have elicited, if
at the time that objection was made to the question by a party ex-
cepting thereto, the tenor of the answer was ascertained by the
court, the name of the witness to whom the question was pro
pounded, the party by whom such witness was introduced, and at
what stage of the examination, whether upon direct, cross, re-
direct examination, et cetera, as the case may be, the qustion was
propounded ;62 in case of the granting or over-ruling of a motion
611ssues out of chancery, etc.
62berely declaratory of the rule already prevailing in W. Va. as to hypothetical
answers. State v. Clifford, 59 W. Va. 1, 52 S. E. 981 (1906); approved and fol-
lowed in the following cases: Hanley, Adm'r v. W. Va. & P. Ry. Co., 59 W. Va. 419.
53 S. E. 625 (1906) ; Delmar Oil Co. v. Bartlett, 62 W. Va. 700, 708, 59 S. E. 634
(1907) ; White v. Sohn, 63 W. Va. 80, 84, 59 S. E. 890 (1907): Smith v. Whitee
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for a new trial, that any paity excepted; in case of an exception by
any party to any other action, ruling, order or judgment, of any
trial court, or of any other matter arising in the course of the
trial or hearing of a cause, it shall be sufficient, instead of a bill
of exception as heretofore obtaining, that the trial judge shall
certify that any party excepted to such action, ruling, order, judg-
ment or matter."
EFFECT WHEN EVIDENCE CERTIFIED By TRIAL JUDGE; WHEN JUDGE
MAY. CErTIFY THE FACTS.
3. That it shall be sufficient for all the purposes of a review by
any appellate court of any action, ruling, order, judgment, or mat-
ter, arising in the course of the trial or hearing of a cause, that the
trial judge shall certify the evidence introduced at the trial or
hearing of such cause when a consideration of the evidence may be
necessary, in order to a decision upon an appeal of any question
involved in such review ;64 but nothing in this act contained shall
be construed to preclude the trial judge from certifying, in lieu
of the evidence, the facts proved on the trial or hearing of the
cause,65 as now provided by law."'
F RMS OF CERTIFICATES OF EXCEPTION.
4. That the forms of the respective certificates hereinabove pro-
vided for shall be substantially as follows:
"The foregoing instruction was granted at the request of the
plaintiff (or defendant) and the defendant (or plaintiff) excepted.
Teste: by consent6 7 (if such be the fact) this ....................... day of
63 W. Va. 472, 476, 60 S. E. 404 (1908) ; State v. Carr, 65 W. Va. 81, 63 S. B. 766
(1908) ; State v. Gebbart, 70 W. Va. 232, 244, 73 S. E. 964 (1912).
69The general effect of this section is to permit informal certification of original
papers or documents. Of course it does not, and could not, abolish the necessity of
reducing to writing for purposes of certification trial matters which are not already
reduced to writing regardless of the exception. But even as to these, it abolishes
all formality.
"The W. Va. statute already requires certification of all the evidence touching
upon the question of any exception. W. VA. CoDE, c. 131, § 9.
It has been held that the W. Va. statute, supra, is directory, not mandatory, and
that a certification of the facts may still be considered on writ of error In lieu of the
evidence. King v. Jordan, 46 W. Va. 106, 110, 32 S. E. 1022 (1899). However, it
Is believed that It is almost the universal custom to certify the evidence.
OThe latter two sections certainly would not affect the rule established in W. Va.
to the effect that objections and exceptions In the reporter's transcript may be noticed
under a general bill of exceptions, if otherwise pointed out to the court, as held in
Kay v. Glade Creek & R. R. Co., 47 W. Va. 467,'35 S. E. 973 (1900), and Hinten
Milling Co. v. New River Milling Co., 78 W. Va. 314, 88 S. E. 1079 (1916). Q:,aere:
Is the W. Va. rule enacted in the Va. statute, § 6, infra? If not, would It not be ad-
visable to have an express provision to such effect?
wFor meaning of "consent", see § 7, of the Virginia statute, infra.
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.......................................... 19 , . . . ............................................
Judge."
"The foregoing instruction requested by the plaintiff (or de-
fendant) was denied, and the plaintiff (or defendant) excepted.
Teste: by consent (if such be the fact) this .......................... day of
.............................................. 19..- , ... ... .................
Judge. ' "
"To the foregoing question propounded to ................................... 
witness for the plaintiff (or defendant) upon direct, cross, re-
direct examination, et cetera, by the plaintiff (or defendant), and
notwithstanding the defendant's (or plaintiff's) objection, allowed
by the court, the defendant (or plaintiff) excepted. Teste: by
consent (if such be the fact) this ............................................ day of
.................................................... ..........................
Judge."
"The foregoing question propounded to ................................
witness for the plaintiff (or defendant), upon direct, cross, re-
direct examination, et cetera, by the plaintiff (or defendant), upon
objection by the defendant (or plaintiff), was disallowed by the
court, and the plaintiff (or defendant) excepted; the answer to
the question excepted by the plaintiff (or defendant) was ............
............................................. Teste: by consent (if such be the fact)
this ................................. ............... ,19-,
.......................................................... Judge."
"The following evidence on behalf of the plaintiff and of the
defendant, respectively, as hereinafter denoted, is all the evidence
that was introdued on the trial of this cause (here insert evidence).
Teste: by consent (if such be the fact) this ...............................-
day of ................................................ 19. ... ...................
Judge. ',68
"The following instructions granted at the request of the plain-
tiff and of the defendant, respectively, as hereinafter denoted, are
all the instructions that were granted on the trial of this case (here
insert instructions). Teste: by consent (if such be the fact) this
--------------------------....... day of ... ...................................... , 19---
................................................. , Judge." 9
68The court reporter, in transcribing his notes, would soon become accustomed to
inserting this certificate at the beginning of the transcript, and the teste, with the
blanks, at the end. How different from the uncertainties of the old incorporation
by reference!
69A11 the instructions given must be certified as a condition to assigning error for
refusal of an instruction. Bartlett v. Bank of Mannington, 87 S. E. 444, 449 (W.
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How EXCEPTIONS PRESERVED OF RECORD; POWERS AND DUTIES OF
APPELLATE COURT UPON APPEAL OR *WVhMT OF ERROR Ol
.ULPERSEDEAS; How RECORD MADE Up BY CLERK OF TRIAL
COURT.
5. That in all cases, to preserve of record to all the intents and
purposes any exception to any action, ruling, order or judgment
of the trial court, or any matter arising in the course of the trial
or hearing of a cause; it shall be sufficient that the trial judge, on
the application of any party, shall certify the same simply and
substantially in accordance with the provisions of this act.70
[6.] That the appellate court in reviewing upon a writ of error,
or supersedeas, to a final judgment, or upon an appeal from a final
decree, of an inferior court in a cause auy question arising upon
the record in such cause shall in every instance, wherever neces-
sary to a decision of such question, consider any exception, the
evidence introduced on the trial or hearing of the cause, or any
other matter, preserved of record in such cause by the certificate
of the trial judge as provided by this act ;71 nor in the determination
of any such question shall it be necessary to enable the appellate
court to consider any other exception, or the evidence introduced
at the trial or hearing of the cause, or any other matter preserved
of record in the cause, by the certificate of the trial judge as pro-
vided by this act, that there shall be any express reference in the
certificate of the exception under which such question may arise to
the certificate of any other exception, of the evidence introduced
at the trial or hearing, or of any other matter, Preserved of record
in the cause, as herein provided ;72 no certificate by the trial judge
under the provisions of this act shall embody the name of the court
or style of the cause, or be otherwise than as herein substantially
provided; nor shall the clerk of any trial court in making up a
Va. 1916). All the instructions will be certified under the first form of certificate
in the statute. Next, those given will be separated from those refused, bound to-
gether, and certified under the general form of certificate at the end of § 4 of the
statute.
"Authenticatlon by certification alone makes the matter certified a part of the
record.
71Does this provision enact the rule followed in Kay v. Glade Creek & R. R. Cr.
and Hinton Milling Co. V. New River Milling Co., as suggested in note 66, supra?
-An abolishment of the requirement of "express reference", the requirement so
deprecated by Professor MINOR, note 48 supra, and still in force in W. Va. Hall v.
Hall, 12 W. Va. 1 (18"7) ; Campbell v. Hughes, 12 W. Va. 183, 208 (1877) ; Corder
v. Talbott, 14 W. Va. 277, 286 (1878); Taylor v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 33 W.
Va. 39, 42, 10 S. E. 29; Klinkler v. Wheeling S. & I. Co., 43 W. Va. 219, 27
S. E. 237 (1897); Chapman v. Beltz & Sons Co., 48 W. Va. 1, 18-19, 35 S. E.
1013 (1900).
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transcript of the record in the cause for any party for the purpose
of praying a writ of error, supersedeas or an appeal, after having
once identified the cause by its proper style in the trial court, in
the caption of such transcript, thereafter in such transcript, re-
produce or repeat the style of such cause, except where the style
of such cause appears as a part of the matter preserved by a cer-
tificate of the trial judge, made under the provisions of this act.
WHEN JUDGE MAY SIGN CERTIFICATES; PROCEDURE WEEN JUDGE
REFUSES TO SIGN SAME. How CONSENT OF PARTIES INDI-
CATED.
7. That any certificate to the intents and purposes of this act
may be signed by the trial judge either during the term of the
court at which a final judgment in the cause is rendered, or within
thirty days after the end of such term,78 either in term time or in
vacation, whether another term of such court shall have inter-
vened or not," or within such period in excess of the period of
thirty days after the end of such term, as the parties by consent
entered of record at any time either in term time or vacation may
agree upon;75 or if any bill of exception now required under any
statute or rule of law or which may hereafter be required by cer-
tificate under this act shall have been presented to the court or
judge in vacation for the signature of the judge, within said thirty
days, or such time as has been agreed upon, and said judge has not
signed said certificate or bill of exception on account of same not
fairly stating the evidence or the case, or for any other cause, said
judge to whom such bill of exception or certificate has been pre-
sented, shall summons the attorneys for the parties before him at
such time and place as he shall see cause, within a reasonable time
after having been so requested by the attorneys of the party filing
the exception or certificate, and amend such bill of exception or
certificate in such manner as shall in his opinion fairly state the
case, and then sign said amended bill of exception or certificate,
and when so signed shall have the same effect as if it had been
signed within said thirty days or the time agreed; and this pro-
'3Same as W. Va. Statute.
14Accord, Layne v. Railway Co., 66 W. Va. 607, 67 S. E. 1103 (1909).
7In W. Va., the thirty-day limitation is construed to be jurisdictional, and hence
cannot be extended by consent. Jordan v. Jordan, 48 W. Va. 600, 37 S. E. 558
(1900). There would seem to be no objection to extending the time, at least by
agreement, except that memory as to the facts to be certified may become less certain.
Other considerations would seem to outweigh this objection. At any rate, the ob-
jection does not exist as to the instructions and evidence, which are preserved
in writing.
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-vision shall apply to all eases now pending in any court of this
Commonwealth and all cases where bills of exception have been
filed with any judge in time but not signed for bny cause, pro-
vided the right of appeal has not been barred by the one year
limitation, from the date of the final entry of the final order ;" and
whenever any cause is heard in vacation any certificate to the in-
tents and purposes of this act may be signed by the trial judge
within thirty days after the entry in vacation of such final judg-
ment, or within such period in excess of the period of thirty days
after the entry of such judgment, as the parties, by consent entered
of record, may agree upon.
It shall be sufficient evidence that the certificate of the trial
judge made under the provisions of this act was signed by him by
such consent of the parties (if such be the fact), on any day -speci-
fied, that such judge shall substantially in accordance with the
forms of certifieate prescribed by this act, so indicate by the inser-
tion of the words "by consent" simply in such certificate.
WHEN SUITS IN CHANCERY NOT AFFECTED.
8. That all statutes or parts of statutes in derogation of, or in
conflict with, the provisions of this act be, and the same are hereby
repealed.
But nothing in this act contained shall be construed to alter or
affect the practice or procedure now obtaining by law with respect
to appeals in suits in chancery, except with respect to such pro-
ceedings where such occur, in any suit in chancery, as are accord-
ing to law, conformed with the practice and procedure at common
law.7
76It would seem that this provision should have been made broader, so as to permit
amendment of the matter certified, even after certification, at least as to inadvertent
omissions of parts of the subject-matter from the certification and as to clerical
errors in general. Such would be In accord with the practice of suggesting diminu-
tIon of the record. But under our present law. it seems that a bill of exceptions can
not be amended after the expiration of the statutory period. Tracy's Adm'x v.
Carver Coal Co., note 43 supra; Woods v. King, note 40, supra. Such a rule places
a bill of exceptions on a higher plane than a judgment or decree, which, although
final, may be impeached in chancery for fraud or mistake.
77The following editorial commentary on the statute appears in 2 VA. LAW REG.
(N. S.) 217: "The * * * Act it will be seen is one in which the legislative
body has attempted to make the question as to preparation of bills of exception no
longer one to which there cannot be a ready answer. It seems to us that this Act
is a most excellent one, and whilst we have no doubt that when put to the test of
practice amendments may be necessary, yet as far as we can see at the present
there is very little to be done by the practicing lawyer except to follow this Act to
the letter. We therefore have only unqualified praise to give it"
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